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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The historical development of a notion is characterized 
by a progressive accumulation of relevant data gathering ~und 
the core notion itself. To each succeeding moment in this pro-
cess accrues new knowledge contributed by the labors of those 
who undertake the task of attempting to determine the meaning 
of the notion involved. Each new moment in the process either 
adds to or subtracts from the already established set of attri-
butes which characterize the notion. The process is additive 
if the notion is discovered to have hitherto unrealized attri-
butes as parts of its meaning. The process is subtractive if 
attributes already contained in the accepted meaning of the 
notion are discovered to be accidentally and not essentially 
related to it. Now, the ultimate meaning ascribed to a notion 
is more a function of the investigator's basic assumptions 
than the mere accumulation of observed facts. Basic assump-
tions are starting points from which conclusions are reached. 
What is true in one system with its own set of basic assump-
tions can be false in another system with different basic 
1 
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assumptions. Since different principles or starting points 
lead to different conclusions, the latter must be understood 
in terms of the former. Thus, different and even diametricall, 
opposed conclusions about the same subject become significant 
and explicable in terms of different basic assumptions. 
Of the many notions which have confronted philosophical 
speculation and received radically different interpretations, 
the notion of human freedom occupies a fundamental place in 
the history of philosophical thought. Time-honored indeed is 
the notion of human freedom. Its continual presence in phil-
osophical dialogue testifies to the attention and interest 
accorded it by human thought. Presently, however, our inquiry 
does not propose to trace the historical development of this 
notion. Rather, our inquiry will attempt to illuminate but 
one of the historical moments in the development of this no-
tion at which it finds expression in the philosophy of William 
James. 
Jemes·s thought exhibits e complex structure which is dUE 
in some degree to the fact that he was both psychologist and 
philosopher. A more iundamental source of the complexity of 
his thought resides in the fact that James's mind was uncom-
monly receptive and even sympathetic to a rather wide and di-
vergent range of notions. Such an attitude enabled James to 
increase the body of his thought by receiving contributions 
from various and often diverse sources. Although not himself 
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the originator of Pragmatism,l James's name is most often as-
sociated with it. Pragmatism, which is not a philosophical 
system but rather a method for dealing with otherwise insol-
uble philosophical problems, was given its most popular elab-
oration in James's works. On the basis of James's pragmatism, 
notions find their worth and candidacy for acceptance as mean-
ingful categories of human thinking in proportion to their 
ability to fit into satisfactory relations with on&~\other 
stock of ideas which are d~rived from one's experiences in the 
world. Moreover, such ideas are counted as true inasmuch as 
they possess consequences for future action. In short, ideas 
find their meaning in relation to the life situation. 
Since the aim of our inquiry is to elucidate the meaning 
of the notion of human freedom as it appears in James's though~ 
any definition at this point would be premature and assume evi 
dence which can be suffiCiently examined only later. Indeed, 
prior to exhibiting the meaning of human freedom we must es-
tablish the ground of the possibility of human freedom in 
James·s thought. In a preliminary way, however, we have al-
ready encountered the criterion according to which notions axe 
evaluated on the basis of the pragmatic method. We may expect 
lro Charles Sanders Peirce belongs the title of "the orig-
inator of Pragmatism.- Peirce later changed the name of his 
doctrine to Pragmaticism to avoid confusion with the pop~lar 
exposition of pragmatism which stressed too much of the prac-
tical or utilitarian aspects of the doctrine. 
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then. that the answer to the question as to the meaning of fre4-
dom in James's thought will somehow derive its meaning in re-
lation to the life situation. 
As a consequence of the fact that James was both psychol-
ogist and philosopher the question of human freedom involves 
both psychological and philosophical aspects. Our inquiry 
will approach the question from this dual aspect. first. in 
Chapter II. James's theory of consciousness will be examined. 
in order to provide the basis for an understanding of his the-
ory of volition. Second, in Chapter III. the various elements 
from which James's theory of volition is constructed will be 
examined. Third, in Chapter IV. the philosophical aspects of 
the question will be examined along with certain observations 
about the kind of universe in which human freedom is a mean-
ingful notion to James. Lastly. in Chapter V. a difficulty 
concerning James's notion of agency in action and its relation 
to human freedom will be noted. the method of approach em-
ployed in previous chapters involved the mere presentation of 
James's views on both the psychological and philosophical as-
pects of the question without any attempt to provide an eval-
uation. Hence. criticism at this point is conspicuous in com-
parison to its absence in previous chapters. However. since 
this difficulty underlies both the psychological and philo-
sophieal aspects of freedom, we have reserved comment until 
both aspects have been examined. 
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The notion of agency in action is of such fundamental im-
portance to freedom that any explanation of freedom that fails 
to ~rovide the effective means of its own exercise lives in an 
atmosphere of existential neutrality, and, as such, is incapa-
ble of providing an adequate account of freedom as a lived ex-
perience. 
In this final chapter, we shall explore the nature of 
this difficulty. Then, on the basis of everything that has 
been said, we shall attempt to state the essential meaning of 
human freedom in the philosophy of William James, 
CHAPTER II 
JAMES'S THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
The examination of the psychological aspects of James's 
notion of freedom will confine itself to what Jan~es has said 
regarding this notion. No attempt will be made to evaluate 
his views as a psychological theory of volition. This is not 
the task of this inquiry. What is pertinent here is the elu-
cidation of the psychological counterpart of James's total 
view of freedom. By examining the psychological aspects of 
this notion, we hope to enhance our understanding of its phil-
osophical meaning in James's thought. 
Now, our resolution to avoid an appIaisal of James's view 
as a psychological theory of volition should not be construed 
as a license to neglect any of its psychological aspects. The 
lack of either positive or negative criticism implies neither 
agreement nor disagreement. Such a procedure merely serves as 
a precautionary measure in order to avoid becoming too deeply 
involved in purely psychological problems. Needless to say, 
however, it is impossible to present the psycho-aspects of 
James's theory of volition without at the same time entering 
into at least an examination of those elements of consciousness 
which are relevant to James's_~~theo:ty of volition. Such a 
6 
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limited consideration is at best a quite inadequate and incom-
plete glance at his notion of consciousness, but a thorough 
examination of this notion would involve a separate study it-
self. What is required to achieve the aim of this inquiry is 
that those elements which constitute the background against 
which, and even according to which, the phenomenon of volition 
occurs be properly elucidated. These elements M.ll then be 
assigned their respective places in James's theory of volition 
Since consciousness is the sphere in which volition oc-
-'-.------ --- "_._-_ .. ,~.,---~--~., ".' -
curs the nature ofconscl(}Usness becomes of paramount import-
ance to volitional activity. The fundamental principle to be 
grasped in understanding the Jamesian notion of consciousness 
is the principle that consciousness is of its very nature im-
pulsive. -The first point to start from in understanding vol-
untary action, and the possible occurrence of it with no fiat 
or express resolve, is the fact that consciousness is in its 
very nature impulsive.- 2 This principle of ideo-motor action 
asserts that whatever idea has dominant possession of the fo-
cal point of consciousness is the idea which will be automa-
tically translated into action. Whenever an idea in the mind 
immediately begets its own peculiar kind of bodily movement 
without hesitation, ideo-motor action is operative. In such 
instances there is no lag between the conception and the 
8 
execution. For James, such action is the prototype of all vo-
litional action. 
Now, in order to understand this principle an examination 
of the following topicS seems to be in order: (8) the con-
ception of consciousness as a stream; (b) consciousness con-
ceived as a complex continuilll; (c) consciousness as being of 
one kind. namely. reflex action. This method follows the di-
vision already made in another work, on James's will theory.3 
Each of these aapects will be examined with a view to estab-
lishing their relation to volition. 
A. Iba Stream Qi Cg0lcioUinelS 
On the notion of consciousness James observes that it is 
a fundamental fact. PThe flrst and foremost concrete fact 
which everyone will affirm to belong to his inner experience 11 
the fact that ,gDlxiguan'ii ~ lome sort ~QII~. 'Statil ~ 
mind lucc,ed ,ach Atbe, in b1m.' If we could say in English 
'it thinks,' as we say 'it rains,' or 'it blows,' we should be 
stating the fact moat simply and with the minimum of assump-
tion. As we cannot. we must Simply say that :tbs:uuatrt goel~' 4 
In such a characterization of consciousness the various states 
are related to each other in such a way the t one experiences a 
mental unity, one continuous mantal flow. 
3walter L. Farrell, S.J •• "The V~ill Theory of William 
James,- Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (Pontifical Grego~n 
University, Rome. 1952). p. 10. 
4William James, PsycbolOgy, Stiefer CQy •• e (New York,l892 
p. 152. 
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These states of consciousness are found to be naturally 
related to each other, for they are but various moments of the 
same continous flow. However, these various states of mind 
are in no way discrete. Each antecedent state surrenders its 
entire content to its consequent state in such a way that therE 
is no gap between the various states. Each consequent state 
appropriates the entire content of all that precedes as its 
proper heritage. In his characterization of consciousness, 
James insists that one should not conceive it after the ~anner 
of a chain or train, but rather, after the manner of a river 
or stream. "Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself 
chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not 
describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. 
It is nothing jointed; it flows. n5 In order to understand 
what James means one might employ a less accurate but perhaps 
none the less helpful characterization in which consciousness 
is likened to the notion of a snow ball as it rolls along in 
the snow. In such a comparison one can imagine the gathering 
mass of the snow ball as it moves along. Now, 50 long as it 
possesses motion it is continually gathering everything in its 
path. In this sense consciousness is continually flowing and 
growing. Granted the motion of consciousness. such a process 
will be seen to be interminable. The obvious difference be-
tween the snow in the present example and thought in the case 
10 
of consciousness is the fact that the former refers to a homo-
geneous content while the latter does not. In any event. the 
principle involved is the same. Whether it be the rolling of 
the snow ball or the flowing of consciousness. there are no 
gaps or discrete moments. In consciousness there is only the 
continuous flow and assimilation 0 f experiences. Such Ci prpcess 
constitutes both the nature and content of consciousness. 
In order to buttress further his conception of conscious-
ness as a stream, James observes that the very structure of 
the nervous system speaks for the aptness of such a character-
ization. The structure of the nervous system is conducive to 
the triadic movement in which all activity is involved. The 
incoming currents bearing messages from the external world are 
conducted to the central nervous system where they are inter-
preted and excite activity in the proper outgoing currents. 
However. this aspect ¥i.ll be considered in connection wi th re-
flex action and consciousness. 
The characterization of consciousness as a stream is not 
itself sufficient to provide a complete picture of the phenom-
enon involved. Not only is consciousness involved in a con-
tinl:ous flow but it is also involved in continuous change. The 
experience of novelty with the passage of each moment of the 
flow is an undeniable fact. As the flow moves forward each 
and every moment discovers a new and different world existing 
on the horizon of sense experience. Thus, experience is 
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constantly remoulding consciousness. No two moments are ever 
the same. Each brain state is modified by each new exper.lsice. 
owever, this does not mean to imply that one can never exper-
ience the same thing twice. Such an interpretation would be 
flagrant violation of everyday experience in which the same 
things are encountered and recogni~ed. What James means is 
that the total conscious experience could never be exactly the 
same. For so long as consciousness moves forward after the 
anner of a stream each new experience modifies the existing 
totality of past experiences. And until all the possible ex-
eriences are possessed there can be no real totality, for so 
as life and consciousness continue each successive mo-
,lent adds something new. The only totality possible would be 
when consciousness has come to an end, i.e., when no further 
experience is possible. But this is possible only when the 
individual has become insensible to the world. 
To clarify his meaning on this subject James employs the 
analogy of the ocean. Considering the numberless waves with 
their crests rising on the surface of the ocean, one might 
well imagine the likelihood of two such crests occupying the 
same point in space at different times. This in no way seems 
unlikely. But what seems impossible is that the same totality 
of waves with their crests and hollows occupying exactly the 
12 
same place should ever occur twice. 6 All of this amounts to 
saying that the stream of consciousness i~ in no way reversi-
ble. Each antecedent state completely succumbs to its con-
sequent state and yields its entire content so perfectly that 
a cross section of any given moment of the stream would con-
tain the whole psychic history of the owner's past life. Each 
mental state is a sort of mental microfilm of the enOrmOIJS 
array of past events. -Every brain state is partly determined 
by the nature of this entire past succession. Alter the lat-
ter in any part. and the brain-state must be somewhat differ-
ent. Each present brain-state is a record in which the eye 
of Omnisience might read all the foregone history of its owner 7 
Thus, these variou~ aspects of consciousness, the fact 
that it is continuous, continually changing, and personal. con-
stitute one of the fundamental facts of consciousnessl it is 
a stream. 
B. CQnsciousness AA A Complex Continuum 
As consciousness moves along after the manner of a stream 
the manifold of sense experience is constantly being incorpor-
ated into its content. The result of this incorporation is 
that consciousness is constructed from really diverse elements 
6 Ibid ., p. 225. 
7Ibid •• p. 234. 
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Everyday experience will testify to this fact. Almost every-
one has had the experience of trying to recall a forgotten 
name or trying to solve a problem that demands the ability to 
evaluate various methods in approaching the probleffi. Names 
or methods are accepted or rejected on the basis of their re-
lation to the idea possessing attention at the moment. Any 
variety of ideas may come to mind while attention is focused or 
a specific object. Yet all the while the mind is engaged in a 
process of selecting or rejecting various ideas on the basis 
of their relation to the primary object. It is even true that 
some ideas never reach the state of being accepted or rejected 
at all. but just remain in the background ready to be called ii 
needed. At any given time the ideas actually in the conscious 
field are few. but beneath this field is a large reservoir of 
ideas ready to be tapped at a moment's notice. 
One may acquire a visual image of this phenomenon by ob-
serving the area of his own visual field. Suppose, for ex-
ample. that one is seated behind a desk looking across the 
room at the door through which a friend at this very moment is 
entering. Although the eyes become fixed on the figure of the 
friend, the image does not exist in a visual vacuum. On the 
contrary, the image of the friend is only part of a larger 
image. The image of the friend is surrounded by a fringe of ob-
jects which are present but are not the primary object of at-
tention. Such objects are the door, wall, desk, and so forth. 
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Now, as these objects extend to the periphery of the visual 
field, they become less and less distinct to the viewer. For 
the moment at least, the image of the friend occupies the 
center of attention and the rest of the objects in the back-
ground are irrelevant. 
Consciousness as James conceives it, may be likened to 
this example. It is composed of concentric rings or layers. 
In the focal point there is that upon which attention is fixed 
In the second layer are impressions which are present but do 
not divert attention from the object under consideration. And 
lastly, at the outermost reaches of consciousness is 3 third 
layer which might be Called the fringe layer. Given James's 
characterization of consciousness as a stream it seems quite 
natural that it is constituted as a complex. For as conscious-
ness flows forward it gathers and assimilates sense impress-
ions which are themselves different. Hence. the contents of 
consciousness are as diverse as the objects which abound in 
the world of experience. 
Since the manifold of experience does not contain impres-
sions of equal interest there must be some way of sorting theSE 
various impressions and assigning them their respective levels 
of consciousness. Such a task is accomplished by the selectiv-
ity of consciousness. Attention determines which impressions 
will occupy the focal point. Attention will become the sub-
ject of investigation later. Suffice it to say at present 
15 
that attention determines what idea will occupy the focal 
point. What is of special interest at present is the inter-
relation among the various layers of consciousness. How do 
these layers interact with each other? Traditional psychology 
according to James, has gone astray on this point: 
The traditional psychology talks like one who should 
say a river consists of nothing but pailsful, spoons-
ful, quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms 
of water. Even were the pails and pots all actually 
standing in the stream, still between them the free 
water would continue to flow. It is just this free 
water of consciousness that psychologists resolutely 
overlook. Every definite image in the mind is steeped 
and dyed in the free water that flows around it. With 
it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, 
the dying echo of whence it cama to us, the dawning 
sense of whither it is to lead. 
Ideas,then, as they occupy consciousness, are always 
immersed in a wider sea of relations. Nothing comes before 
the mind in the pure state unattended by its living associates 
And the various elements within the continuum react in such a 
way as to stimulate and modify action. 
C. Consciousness ££ Reflex Action 
The final aspect to be noted about James's notion of con-
sciousness is its relation to the type of activity known as 
reflex action. This doctrine asserts that a stimulus imping-
ing On a sensory receptor initiates an impulse which traverses 
the afferent process to a mediating body and then along the 
8Jarnes, Brief~l CQurse, pp. 165-166. 
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efferent process until it terminates in action. 
In considering reflex action as one of the aspects of 
consciousness one is confronted with what is perhaps the most 
pert)lexing problem of James's whole psychology: the problem 
of th~ Mind-body relationship. Although this problem pervades 
the whole of James's psychology, it is most strikingly empha-
sized in connection with reflex action. Simply stated, the 
problem is concerned with the nature of the relationship be-
tween th~~~t process and neural "process. It will satisfy the 
needs of the present inquiry if this problem merely be noted 
without attempting to provide an analysis of the elements in-
volved. 
James's indifference to the psychical or physiological 
level of explanation employed in accounting for various kinds 
of action is the source of a great deal of confusion. For 
instance, ~en speaking of the interaction between ideas in 
which the presence of one idea may interfere with another, 
James seems to situate the discussion on the purely physiolog-
ical level. And then as if to further clarify everything al-
ready said, James summarizes the discussion in the following 
way: "A wak.ing man t s behavior is thus at all times the re-
sultant of two opposing neural forces.- 9 Such a statement 
leaves one in doubt as to which explanation James means to 
9James, Principles, II, 527. 
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convey_ James confesses his own doubt on this matter in anothEr 
passage. "I cannot see how such a thing as consciousness can 
10 possibly be produced by a nervous machinery.M 
Again, when discussing the immortality of the soul, James 
begs hi s li steners •• to agree wi th me today in subscribing to 
the great psycho-physiological formula: Thought is the func-
tion.-9.L the b:ain_ M lr-~~~~·~e··do~~·~ld remain. it seems, 
after this sort of unequivocal statement about the nature of 
thought. In spite of the materialistic ring of this formula. 
James avoids a purely materialistic conclusion by suggesting 
that the brain has a transmissive and not a productive func-
tion. 12 
Admittedly, it is quite tempting 1n the light of the fore-
going statement to classify James's interpretation of con-
sciousness as nothing ~ reflex action. Y~t there is evidencE 
that James himself was unsettled about this matter. And this 
evidence was seen in relation to James's explanation of activ-
ity on the psychical or physiological level with no adequate 
distinction between these levels. To classify James as 
10William James. Telks ~ Teachers ~ Psychology (New 
York. 1939). p. 190. 
llWilliam James, -Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objec-
tions to the Doctrine," .I.b..it Will .iQ. ~elieye .a.rui Other Essays 
1A Popular Philosopby (New York. 1956 • p. 10. 
12 Ibid •• p. 15. 
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belonging to the nothing ~ class would seem, then, to be 
somewhat hasty, since his view was incomplete and unfinished. 
In fact, James was fully aware of the difficulty of the 
~lind-body relationship. But the difficulty aa he conceived it 
could not be settled on psychological grounds. To James, the 
science of psychology was in a state similar to what physics 
was before Galileo, or what chemistry was before Lavoisier. 
Further, psychology as a science, thought James, must aim at 
a causal explanation and not remain satisfied with a mere des-
criptive account. l3 And the subject matter for such a science 
should be the mind-body relationship. Since, however, psychol-
ogy had not advanced far enough to provide precise answers to 
certain questions regarding the exact nature of this relation-
ship, the psychologist must work with the facts at his dis-
posal. Thus it seems that James felt at liberty to speak with 
indifference of either the physiological or psychical causes 
of action, while being fully aware that both were involved as 
causal factors and that the science of the future must take 
both into account in its explanation of human action. 
Perhaps a consideration of the close connection between 
reflex action and the autornat9u theory will serve to clarify 
somewhat the problem as it appeared to James. Briefly stated, 
13perry, Ib& Thgught ~ Cha.acter AL William James, II, 
119. 
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the autoffiaton theory holds that behavior is entirely determine( 
by sense impressions which pass from the stimulated nerve end-
ings through the central nervous system and out again through 
the musculature. Furthermore, in such a conception conscious-
ness is present, but is inefficacious. Now the inefficacy of 
consciousness is precisely what James does not allow. In 1879 
there appeared an article entitled -Are We Automata?M in which 
James attacked this theory on the basis of its denial of the 
efficacy of consciousness. The gist of his argument centers 
around his claim that the cerebrum is distinguished from the 
spinal cord by its instabi~ity and indeterminateness of ac-
tion. It is potentially capable of a great diversity of ac-
tions. If it is not to be simply a sphere of disordered event! 
subject to the varying demands of impinging stimuli, guidance 
is needed. The possession of guidance allows it to meet the 
demands of a changing world in some orderly fashion. Now con-, 
sciousness is found to be characterized on every level by dis-
crimination and choice. 14 Further, since consciousness has 
evolved it may be assumed to be useful. Hence, in conscious-
ness there is found both the affirmation and expression of the 
organism's interest, an interest which determines brain activ-
ity according to its needs. The meaning herein contained is 
l4William James, "Are We Automata?·' Mind" IV (January, 
1879), 13. 
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that the higher centers have intelligibility only in terms of 
lPurposes or ends, for "teleology is an exclusively conscious 
function."l5 
Thus, the brain is conceived as the organizer of the or-
ganism's experiences. And these experiences are seen to pos-
sess meaning when they are interpreted in terms of the organ-
ism'. needs. The same sort of argument appears in "Reflex 
..... 
Action and Theism,· in which James insists that the acceptance 
pf the doctrine of reflex action commits one to the view that 
the mind is an essentially teleol09!~_~1. mechanism. 
I mean by this that the conceiving or theorizing faculty--
the mind s middle department--functions jxclusively ~ 
~ saki ~ end, that do not exist at all in the worra-
of impressions we receive by way of our senses. but are 
set by our emotional and practical subjectivity alto-
gether. It is a transformer of the world of our im-
pressions into a totally different world.--~ne world of 
our conception; and the transformation is effected in 
the interests of our volitional nature. and for no other 
purpose whatsoever. Destroy the volitional nature, the 
definite subjective purposes, pref.rences, fondnesses. 
and not the slightest motive waule remain for th!6brute 
order of our experience to be remodelled at all. 
~hus. the contribution of consciousness on the conceptual level 
~s the transformation of brute experiences for the sake of ends~ 
~ather than agreeing with the a~tomaton theory that conscious-
ness is merely epiphenomenal and lacking in efficacy, James 
l~Ibig., 7. 
l6William James, "Reflex Action and Theism 11 .Ib.f:. W1ll .:tJ4 
Beli_va ~ Qtb,: Elsays lD POPUli: Philosophy {New York, 1956) 
Pp. 117--US. 
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considers it as interacting with the physical and thereby pos-
sessing its own kind of efficacy. James's view of the mind-
body relation would therefore rest on the principle of inter-
actionism. To James's mind, thought is for the sake of action. 
Ccns>c:iD_us_~es~ __ ~.<?~s not merely supervene, it intervenes. 
For James, however. the rejection of the automaton theory 
did not necessarily involve the rejection of the doctrine of 
reflex action. And this is so because reflex action can be 
interpreted on the basis of either the automaton or interac-
tionist theory. The latter interpretation is the one decided 
on by James. However, the exact relationship between the phy-
siological and psychical spheres still remains a mystery. 
Such. then, is the final aspect to be considered about 
consciousness, that it is a phase of the type of all action, 
---· __ ~o,_ 
namely, reflex action. 
The consideration of these three aspects of consciousness 
was undertaken in order to throw some light on the principle 
that consciousness is in its very nature impulsive. That is tc 
say, the principle that states whatever idea is in posseSSion 
of the focal point of consciousness will automatically pass 
over into action. And this was seen to be true because con-
sciousness flows after the manner of a stream. And as it flows 
forth it gathers a multitude of diverse sense impressions. 
thereby constituting it as a complex continuum. Lastly, since 
it is a stage in the reflex are, consciousness mediates betweer 
22 
incoming and outgoing currents. In this role as a mediating 
agency consciousness modifies behavior. Now, all these aspect 
taken together constitute the dynamic structure of conscious-
ness. Thus, consciousness can be described as being in its 
very nature impulsive. 
CHAPTER III 
JAMES'S THEORY OF VOLITION 
Our examination of the basic structure of consciousness, 
that it is a stream, a complex continuum, and of one kind, 
name~y, reflex action, was undertaken for the purpose of il-
... ----_ .. -
luminating James's theory of volition. But the foregoing ac-
_____ ~ .--_ ..... M<_~ •• _._~ •• • ".~ • ......,.--'"- -.!---,,' ""'V --"'_~ 
count of the mechanisms involved in consciousness hardly seem 
to describe operations on the volitional level. Surely James 
does not mean to explain volition in this way. On the con-
trary,the principle of ideo-motor action Uobeys the type 
.-~----,-.. ~~-.... ~.'- ~-----~--~-.. ------•.. " 
of all conscious action, and from it one must start to explain 
the;~~t-····~i··~·~tion in which a special fiat is involved.· 17 And 
this is especially true with regard to the doctrine of reflex 
action. 
All our deeds were considered by the early psy-
chologists to be due to a peculiar faculty called the 
will, without whose fiat action could not occur. Thoughts 
and impre!..~ions, being intrinsically inactive, w~;-e sup-
posad to produce conduct only through the intermeaiatio[1 
of this superior agent. Until they twitched its coattail, 
17James, Briefer Course, p. 427. 
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so to speak, no outward behavior could occur. This 
doctrine was long ago exploded by the discovery of the 
phenomena of reJlecx action,. In.w.hJc.h: f)efls;tJ:~le_"Jm"7 
pressians" as you know, produce 'movement immediately 
a.£l_<l.J)J._,t.J~.~'!l.~~_~lves. The doctf~ne may also be considered 
exploded as far as ideas go. 
The relevance of the foregoing considerations should now be 
evident. Such considerations are fundamental to an understand· 
ing of James's theory of volition. 
Nevertheless, such a characterization would seem to ignorE 
the essential as,.>ect of any theory of volition. And the essen-
tial aspect of any theory of volition is that aspect which pro 
vides an answer to the question why one idea rather than an~I 
occupies the focal point of consciousness. The answer to this 
question will be found in the examination of James's notion of 
decision and its various divisions. The need for decision 
arises as a consequence of the complication of consciousness 
by more than one idea seeking to monopolize the focal point. 
The resolution of this struggle can be accomplished in either 
one of two ways: the opposing ideas are allowed to struggle 
until one is victorious and therefore terminates in action. or 
if the struggle admits of no solution. an additional force is 
brought to bear in order to settle the deadlock. According to 
James, the former kind of decision requires consent; the lat-
ter requires effort. 
18 James, Talks, p. 170. 
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The moments of decision in which one is called upon to 
tutter the voluntary fiat have been analyzed by James into 
five general types. The first type of decision is what James 
calls the reasonable type. The arguments for and against a 
certain action are settled and one adopts one of the alter-
natives. In such cases, ~we seem to ourselves almost passive, 
and the 'reasons' which decide us appear to flow from the 
nature of thingS r and to owe nothing to our will. We have, 
however, a perfect sense of being free, in that we are devoid 
of any feeling of coercion. p 19 In the second type deter-
mination comes from without, and the feeling is that t'we might 
20 as well stand by this course as by the other. p In the 
third type the accidental determination comes from within and 
one acts almost automatically. In the fourth type of decision 
deliberation is terminated by the fact that the whole scale 
of values is shifted Pin consequence of some outer experience 
or some inexplicable inward change.~ 21 
In the fifth type of decision one may feel that all the 
evidence is in and that the scale has been balanced, but "we 
feel, in deciding, as if we ourselves by our own wilful act 
19James, B.iefer Course, p. 430. 
20 Ibid ., p. 431-
21 Ibid ., p. 432. 
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inclined the beam ••• The slow dead heave of the will that 
is felt in these instances makes them a class altogether 
different subjectively from all four preceding classes." 22 
It is in this fifth and final type of decision that one 
experiences the feeling of effort. 
Now, within the framework of these five types of decision 
lies the answer to the question of which idea enjoys posses-
sion of the focal point of consciousness. In other words, 
these five types of decision are at the bottom of the Jamesian 
theory of volition. 
The first four types of decision may be included under 
the general heading of the volition of consent, while the 
fifth type requires its own special classification, since it 
requires an additional force to achieve its goal. This addi-
tional force is experienced as the feeling of effort. This 
last type will be called the volition of effort. Our method 
follows a division already made in another work on James' will 
theory.23 
The volition of consent will be found to rest on the 
principle of association, while the volition of effort will 
be found to rest on the notion of attention. It becomes 
necessary, then, to examine each of these with a view to 
22James. Briefer gQurse. pp. 432-433. 
23 See above, p. 9, n. 3. 
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establishing their relation to the volitional life. We shall 
examine (a) the notion of association and its relation to the 
volition of consent; and (b) the notion of attention and its 
relation to the volition of effort. 
A. Association and Consent 
On the topic of association James observes that there is 
a fundamental dependence of thought on the associative 
machinery: "There are. then, mechanical conditions on which 
thought depends, and which, to say the least, determine the 
order in which is presented the content or material for her 
comparisons, selections, and decisions. tl24 In the present 
context the various parts of the content of consciousness are 
being considered with regard to how they act and influence 
each other. In this respect, the notion of associates enters 
the discussion of consent. 
In his discussion of association James's intention is to 
show ~that there is no other elementary causal law of associa-
tion than the law of neural habit. All the materials of our 
thought are due to the way in which one elementary process of 
the cerebral hemispheres tends to excite whatever other elemen-
tary process it may have excited at some former time. The 
number of elementary processes at work. however, and the 
nature of those which at any time are fully effective in 
24James, Prlnciples, I. 553. 
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rousing the others, determine the character of the total brain-
~ction; and, as a consequence of this, they determine the 
object thought of at the time." 25 
But a difficulty immediately arises as a result of such 
a description. For it is no doubt obvious that almost every 
neural process has, at one time or another, been connected 
with various other neural processes. Hence, which neural 
process is to be awakened by a given process involves a prob-
lem.. For example, suppose a given process A has been associ-
ated in the past with both processes Band C. Now, upon the 
occurrence of process A which associate, process C or a, is to 
~e awakened? Something more than the basic law between ele-
mentary brain processes is required to answer this question. 
James is aware of this difficulty and attempts to provide an 
answer. Association, according to James, is found to rest on 
the factors of repetition of the process, intensity of the 
process, and the lack of an opposing process. 26 Now it is 
precisely in connection with the last of these factors that 
the relation between volition and assciation becomes evident. 
Concern here is directed to the volition of consent and the 
manner in which deliberation is settled. 
The process of deliberation contains end-
less degrees of complication. At every 
25James, PrinCiples, I, 566. 
26 Ibid ., 567 
moment of it our consciousness is an 
extremely complex object, namely, the 
existence of the whole set of motives, 
and their conflict ••• Of this object. 
the totality of which is realized more or 
less dimly all the while, certain parts 
stand out more or less sharply at one 
moment in the foreground. and at another 
moment other parts. in consequence of the 
oscillations of our attention and 2Qf the tassociative' flow of our ideas. 7 
29 
Thus, deliberation is seen to be dependent on the workings of 
the associative machinery. Deliberation, then is simply the 
balancing of various motives until the issue is settled and 
the way to action is cleared. 
The role of association in the volition of consent now 
becomes clear. The associative machinery 'provides the will 
with a vast array of ideas and their associates from which the 
will may choose. The sole function of the will is to -empha-
size and linger over those which seem pertinent, and ignore 
the rest." 28 Furthermore, the act of lingering and choosing 
among the associates allows the associates of an idea to 
gather around one idea or another until the force of the 
gathering associates and its core idea weigh so heavily on the 
moment that "their neural processes break through the bar, and 
27James, PriD,iple§, II, 528-529. 
28James, Briefer Course. p. 274. 
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the nervous wave pours into the tract which has so long been 
awaiting its advent." 29 Association, then, is the foundation 
of the volition of consent. 
One further point about the volition of consent must be 
noted. The four modes of decision included under the heading 
of the volition of consent are all characterized by a certain 
amount of passivity. For example, in the first type of 
decision, the reasonable type, action is kept in suspense be-
cause of the feeling that the evidence is not all in. 
But some day we wake with the sense that we see 
the thing rightly, that no new light will be 
thrown on the subject by further delay, and that 
the matter had better be settled~. In this 
easy transition from doubt to assurance we seem 
to ourselves almost passive; the 'reasons' which 
decide us appearing to flow in from the nature of 
things, and to owe nothing to our will. We have. 
however. a perfect sense of being free, in30hat we are devoid of any feeling of coercion. 
All four types of decision included under the volition of 
consent are characterized by this passivity. In fact, this 
is true of the greater part of one's volitional life. ~Con­
sent is passive; and three-fourths of our daily conduct con-
sists in simply taking off the brakes, and letting ideas and 
impulses have their way.- 31 On the other hand, "volition 
29James, Briefer Course, p. 274. 
30James. Princ~ples, II, 531. 
31William James, "What the Will Effects,· §cribnerts 
Magazine, III (February,1888), 243. 
31 
32 implies something positive, energetic, akin to effort.-
Now, from such an account it seems clear that consent 
occupies a sphere somewhat removed from the juridical process 
itself. In fact, the greater portion of the work of volition 
is carried on at the level of association. Although consent 
is present and even necessary to decision it is in no way 
involved in the struggle itself. The idea and its band of 
associates which finally manages to occupy the focal point owes 
its survival to the workings of the associative machinery. 
Consent is merely an indifferent witness to the process and 
in no way involved in it. Consent seems to be required for 
little more than granting its formal stamp of approval. 
Such, then, is the place of association in the volitional 
life. In summarizing the relation of volition and association 
James's own statement is perhaps clearest. ... Volition is the 
association of ideas of muscular motion with the ideas of 
those pleasures which motion produces. The motion at first 
occurs automatically and results in a pleasure unforeseen. The 
latter becomes so associated with the motion that whenever we 
think of it the idea of the motion arises; and the idea of the 
motion when vivid causes the motion to occur. This is an act 
of will .... 33 
32Ibid • 
33James, Principles, I, 599-600. 
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The volition of consent. however. does not exhaust the 
discussion of the phenomenon of will. In the discussion of 
association it was noted that the will lingers and chooses 
among the ideas and their associates. Further. in the fifth 
type of decision it was seen that an additional force was 
required to end deliberation. Decision was achieved only by 
means of a resolute effort in favor of one of the conflicting 
ideal. Both of these aspects, lingering and effort, will be 
found to be based on James" notion of attention. These 
aspects will be found to be at the very core of James's theory 
of volition. 
B. AtteDtlon And Effo[t 
Among the various sense impressions to which one is 
exposed in everyday experience only a few actually receive 
attention at any given moment. Now. this is but another way 
of saying that consciousness exercises a selective activity. 
James lists several physiological reasons to account for this 
fact. first, the hemispheres. when occupied by incoming cur-
rents, keep other currents out. Second, since the activity 
of the hemispheres tends at all times to be consolidated and 
unified, consciousness will thereby be narrow. Consciousness 
is determinable only as a whole. 34 This does not mean to 
say, however, that there can be no other processes in the 
3J 
sphere of consciousness, for there are processes occupying 
other areas of consciousness. What is being considered at 
present is the focal point of consciousness. 
In order to account for the unity of the hemispheres 
during the attentive process James enumerates three physiolo~i. 
cal conditions. The first of these conditions requires that 
the appropriate cortical center be excited both ideationally 
as well as sensorially before the attentive process can occur. 
Second, the sense organ must dispose itself aptly to receive 
the object. This is achieved by the appropriate muscular 
activity. And third, there is probably a certain afflux of 
blood to the cortical center. 35 Of the third condition James 
says no more for it admits of no proof, and he merely states 
it on the faith of general analogies. The second condition, 
the accommodation of the sense organ involves such everyday 
experiences as the turning of the eyes or ears toward the 
source of visual or auditory activity in the environment. 
Among the three conditions enumerated by James the first 
commands special attention because it seems to exceed the realn 
of purely physiological factors and situates itself on the 
psychical level; it seems to straddle the psychical and 
physiological spheres. There are, then, ideational as well as 
physiological causes involved in attention, for the first 
35 Ibid., p. 228 
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condition makes it quite clear that physiological causes alone 
are not themselves sufficient to account for attention. 
Although the basis of division of attention is complex, 
the only basis important to the present purpose is the dif-
ference bet~een voluntary and involuntary attention. An 
object of involuntary attention »appeals to some one of our 
congenital impulses or has a directly exciting quality." 36 
"¥oluntary attention," on the other hand, llis always derived; 
we never make an effort t6 attend to an object except for the 
sake of some remote interest which the effort will serve." 37 
Thus voluntary and involuntary attention are distinguished on 
the basis of immediate or remote ends. 
But given the fact that consciousness is complex, what 
about those moments when consciousness is complicated by two 
or more ideas both of which are immediately appealing? In 
such cases, according to James, decision is achieved only 
through effort. Attention is given to one of the conflicting 
ideas thereby excluding the others. And this is the fifth 
type of decision. This kind of decision stands out against 
the other four kinds of decision which are settled on the 
level of the associative machinery. But in the fifth type of 
decision, a solution on the associative level is Impossible. 
36 Ibid ., p. 221. 
37 Ibid • 
35 
It requires some additional force to break the deadlock. In 
these moments of decision, the additional force is experienced 
as the feeling of effort. 
Subjectively and phenomenally, the feeling ~ effo.t, 
absent from the former decisions, accompanies these. 
Whether it be the dreary resignation for the sake of 
austere and naked duty of all sorts of rich mundane de-
lights, or whether it be the heavy resolve that of two 
mutually exclusive trains of future fact, both sweet and 
good, and with no strictly objective or imperative prin-
ciple of choice between them, one shall forevermore be-
come impossible, while the other shall become reality, 
it is a desolQte and acrid sort of act, an excursion into 
a lonesome moral wilderness. If examined closely, its 
chief difference from the three former cases appears to 
be that in those cases the mind at the moment of decid-
ing on the triumphant alternative dropped the other one 
wholly or nearly out of sight, whereas here both alter-
natives are steadily held in view, and in the very act 
of murdering the vanquished possibility the chooser 
reali 3§s how much in that instant he is making himself lose. 
Attention, then, is at the bottom of the volition of ef-
ort. For it is by means of effort that one achieves resolu-
ion of otherwise insoluble conflicts. In choosing by means 
pf the effort of attention one exercises power on one's own 
~ct. This is the core of the Jamesian theory of volition. 
Not only is attention at the bottom of the volition of 
~ffort, but it is also at the bottom of the volition of con-
~ent. This is so because the volition of consent is based on 
he doctrine of association. The function of the will in the 
olition of consent is the lingering and choosing of the 
38James, P.inciples, II, 534. 
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appropriate ideas and their associates. Now, such lingering 
and choosing is achieved by means of attention--the attending 
to this idea rather than another. Hence. the principles dis-
cussed in the account of the effort of attention can be ex-
tended to include voluntary association. 
James's own words summarize very well everything already 
said in this examination of volition: ftThis strain of atten-
tion is the fundamental act of the will._ 39 
In the light of the foregoing discussion there would seem 
to be no doubt as to James's position on the question of free-
will. His account of the rGle of effort in moments of deci-
sion seems to provide the basis for including him among the 
ranks of those who hold the doctrine of free-will. Such a 
conclusion. however, would be somewhat premature. For it must 
be remembered that James has been considering the question of 
free-will within the framework of the science of psychology. 
The nature of volition was discovered as a result of the 
elucidation of James's theory of consciousness. James char-
acterized consciousness as being a stream, a complex contin-
uum, and a type of activity known as reflex action. These as-
pects taken together constitute consciousness as being by its 
very nature ~.pulsive. According to James. any theory of vo-
lition must take its starting point from this principle of the 
37 
impulsiveness of consciousness. Volition. then. can be under-
stood obly against the background of the mechanisms of con-
sciousness. Further. on the basis of association and atten-
tion two kinds of volition are recognized, the volition of con· 
sent and effort, respectively. Effort, according to James, is 
the point at which any claim for the freedom of the will must 
take its stand, since everything else seems due to mechanical 
laws. PreCisely at this point, however. James the psychol-
ogist has one final word to add: the question of free-will is 
insoluble on purely psychological grounds. 
But such a conclusion seems totally foreign to everything 
James has already said. It is as if with one stroke James has 
invalidated all the data so carefully gathered from his anal-
ysis of volition. This is strikingly true with regard to the 
phenomenon of effort. In the fifth type of decision effort 
was seen to have a vital role in the resolution of otherwise 
insoluble conflicts. Its function in this last type of deci-
sion is the dwelling on one of the conflicting ideas to the 
exclusion of the other. If effort 'could sustain or protract ar 
idea long enough from its associates to gather around it, then 
this idea would occupy the focal point of consciousness and 
therefore quite automatically beget its own motor effects.With-
out effort, however, resolution and consequent action were im-
possible. Effort, then, is the basis of free-will. The fact 
of the matter is, according to James. that the effort involved 
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n this sort of volition is so minute that it cannot be meas-
red. the imp~ication being that the science of psychology can 
,ake no claims concerning the question of free-will. 
But one might immediately object that the inability of 
he science of psychology to measure the amount of effort ex-
rted is hardly grounds for excusing itself from a considera-
ion of the question. For is it not true that James has des-
ribed such moments of decision as involving a "straining of 
he attention?~ And what of the subjectively felt effort in 
.oments of decision? The feeling of effort. and the feeling 
hat more or less could be exerted, seems sufficient for ad-
ilitting the freedom of the will. The feeling of effort, how-
ver, is not sufficient to satisfy the science of psychology. 
~or the experienced as experienced is evidently not sufficient 
~rounds for the science of psychology to admit that effort is 
n indeterminate factor. Nothing less than the experienced as 
,erifiable will satisfy this science. And this sort of veri-
ication demands. as James conceives it, a quantified equiva-
~ent of effort. And since effort is too minute a quantity to 
)e measured, psychology can make no claims on this question. 
~ut why, after all, must effort be capable of measurement in 
prder that the science of psychology can make some contribution 
~o a solution of the problem? This attitude seems to betray a 
pistruat of immediate sense experience. 
James provides the basis for this interpretation in his 
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analysis of the fundamental problem of the science of psychol-
ogy as it approaches the question of free-will. The prob1em, 
according to James, revolves around the question whether effor 
is determinate or indeterminate in amount. 
It certainly appears to us indeterminate, and as if. 
even with an unchanging object, we might make more or lesl t 
as we choose. If it be really indeterminate. our future 
acts are ambiguous or unpredestinate: in common par-
lance, ~ wills ~ free. If the amount of effort be 
not indeterminate, but be related in a fixed manner to 
the objects themselves, in such wise that whatever object 
at any time fills o~r consciousness was from eternity 
bound to fill it then and thare. and compel from us the 
exact effort, neither more nor less; which we bestow up-
on it--then our wills are not free, and all our acts are 
foredained. lhL question Rf fact iA ~ free-will ~­
troversy lA thus extremely simple. It relates solely to 
the amount of effort of attention or consent which we can 
at any time put forth. Are the duration and intensity 
of tgia effort fixed functions of the oeject, or are they not~O 
Thus, the question of fact in the free-will controversy bears 
on wh~ther effort is a fixed function of the object or an in-
dependent variable. Having established the question of fact 
in the matter of free-will James proceeds to answer the ques-
tion as to the ability of the science of psychology to pro-
vide an answer. 
My own belief is that the question of free-will is 
insoluble on strictly psychologic grounds. After a cer-
tain amount of effort of attention has been given to an 
idea it is manifestly impossible to tell whether either 
more or less of it might have been given or not. To tell 
that, we should have to ascend to the antecedents of the 
4C James, Principles, II, 571. 
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effort, and defining them with mathematical exactitude, 
prove, by laws of which we have not at present even an 
inkling, that the only amount of sequent effort which 
could possib~y comport with them was the precise amount 
which actually came. Measurements, whether of psychic 
or of neural quantities, and deductive reasonings such 
as this method implies, will surely be forever beyond 
human reach. 41 
Since, then, the science of psychology can make no measurement 
of effort in the effort of attention, it can make no pronounce-
ment on the question of free-will. 
In order to avoid confusion let us be explicit with re-
gard to the exact point in question. From Jamests analysis it 
is abundantly clear that the fundamental question of fact in 
the free-will controversy hinges on whether effort is determi~ 
ate or indeterminate in amount. Presently, however, we are in-
terested in the method of the science of psychology as it ap-
proaches this question. Before the science of psychology can 
make any pronouncement on the question of free-will the ground 
of the possibility of dealing with the phenomenon itself must 
be established. That is to say, before any conclusion cen be 
reached evidence must be available as the foundation upon 
which the conclusion rests. The only way in which the science 
of psychology can say anything whatsoever about the question 
of fact in the free-will controversy is on the condition that 
effort can be quantified in some way. The possibility of the 
4lJames, P.inciples, II, 572. 
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quantification of effort means first of all that the effort 
involved in the effort of attention be of sufficient magnitude 
to affect the instruments which are designed to detect and re-
cord it as a quantifie~ datum indicated, presumably, by some 
sort of pointer ieading. Now, it is precisely at this point 
that the science of psychology finds itself not only unable to 
offer an answer to the question, but even unable to establish 
any sort of connection with the phenomenon to be investigated. 
Because of its minute character, effort fails to make itself 
available as a recorded datum. As a consequence of its fail-
ure to make itself known as a quantified datum, effort must be 
denied the honor of scientific respectability. In other words 
it is because of the immeasurability of effort that the sciencE 
of psychology can make no pronouncement on the question of 
free-will. 
This interpretation is buttressed by James·s observations 
on the matter of attention. -Effort may be an original force 
and not a mere effect, and it may be indeterminate in amount. 
The last word of sober insight here is ignorance, for the 
forces engaged are too delicate ever to be measured in detaif~ 
Thus, as far as the science of psychology is concerned, the 
question of free-will is unanswerable because of the minute 
character of effort which lies beyond the range of instrument 
42James, ~riefer Course, p. 238. 
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detec~ion. 
On the subjec~ive level, however, the experience of ef-
fort and the effects it involves cannot be denied. 
~ effects ~ interested attention ~ volition re-
main. These activities seem to hold fast to certain ele-
ments and, by emphasizing them and dwelling on them, to 
make their associates the only ones which are evoked. 
Ihis is the point at which 8n anti-mechanical psychology 
must, if anywhere, make its stand in dealing with assoc-
iation. Everything else is pretty certainly due to cere-
bral laws • • • But even though there be a mental spon-
taneity, it can certainly not create ideas or summon them 
~ abrupto. Its power is limited to select~ng amongst 
those which the associative machinery introduces. If it 
can emphasize, reinforce, or protract for half a second 
either of these, it can do all that the most eager advo-
cate of free will need demand ••• 43 
Such is the last word of James the psychologist regarding 
the question of free will. Free will is hypothetically true, 
on the condition that the amount of effort exerted is indeter-
minate. Or perhaps one might say that as far as the science 
of psychology is concerned free will is possible only. 
Although, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the 
science of psychology is unable to make any claim on the ques-
tion of human freedom, there is yet another avenue of approach 
by which one may explore the question. Such an approach con-
siders the question under its philosophical aspects. In his 
philosophical approach to the question of human freedom James 
considers his own contribution to 8 solution of the question 
43James, ~efer CQurse, p. 279. 
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to be quite modest in comparison to the work of others who havE 
considered the qUE.;s"tj.on. Among the others who have considered 
the question, James refers to the work of Charles Sanders 
P . 44 C1.rce. James's sole purpose in considering the question is 
aimed at merely clarifying some of the necessarily implied 
corollaries of the doctrine of determinism in order that one 
may reasonably decide the issue in its true light. 
44C• S. Peirce, "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined," 
1b& Monist II, (April,1892), 321-337. In this article Peirce 
adduces the principle of chance-spontaneity to account for 
irregularities in the universe. His argument is directed 
against the necessaritarian who prefers to suppose that speci-
fication in every order, psychical as well as physical, re-
verts back to the very beginning of things. Such a conception 
precludes the possibility of any novelty in the universe. 
James's own rejection of deterministic monism is based on the 
same sort of argument. 
CHAPTER IV 
PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF FREEDOM 
Admittedly, James offers no coercive proof in behalf of 
free will. "I thus disclaim openly on the threshold all pre-
tension to prove to you that the freedom of the will is true. 
The most I hope is to induce some of you to follow my own ex-
ample in assuming it true, and acting as if it were true. n45 
However. James's invitation to follow his example in regarding 
the freedom of the will as true may at first glance seem to be 
based on a totally gratuitous assumption. If there be no co-
ercive proof then one could equally well assume that the will 
is not free. For James, the question of freedom is not limit-
ed to the sphere of academic curiosities where logical princi-
ples reign supreme. On the contrary, the only meaning the 
freedom of the will has is its relation to the experiences of 
life. The basis of value for assuming the will to be free lies 
in the life situation. 
Before examining the meaning of freedom in relation to 
the life situation, it is worth noting James's reason for con-
sidering philosophy incompetent in this matter. Now, the 
45William James, tiThe Dilemma of Determinism," ~ Will .Is; 
IBeliey_e Jl.D.9. Other Essays .in Popular Philosophy (New York., 
1956), p. 145. 
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first step in solving any problem is to state the problem. 
Such a step involves the naming of relevant terms. Further, 
of crucial importance is finding the right names for the is-
sues involved, since providing the right name is equivalent to 
seeing the issues in their true light. 46 The question of the 
freedom of the will is complicated enough without further en-
cumbering it with ambiguities so familiar on the linguistic 
level. To this end, James proposes to rid the discussion of 
the eulogistic word freedom, and replace it with the opprobri-
ous word chance. This is required by the fact that the former 
word is too rich in subjective intention. As a substitute for 
freedom, chance means that there is a certain ambiguity about 
future events. Chance events are in no way obliged to make 
their appearance at a given time. There is no necessity in 
the scheme of things demanding that these events make their 
advent at a given moment. Chance, when it comes, is a free 
gift outside the claims of any other part of the universe. 
In an essay especially dedicated to the question of free-
dom, James transposes the question to the level of the dispute 
between determinism and indeterminism. As the issues present 
themselves at this level the whole meaning of the question 
46 For the reasoning behind this statement see James, 
Briefer Cou.se, p. 453. 
46 
"relates solely to the existence of possibilities.n 47 
On the one hand, indeterminism grants that there is order 
in the universe based on natural laws. but regards some of the 
actions of man as lying outside these natural laws, since man 
is capable of intelligent action. And the personal feeling of 
one's power over the moment. the feeling that things are being 
decided here and now, is the best available evidence in behalf 
of this view. Man is capable of choosing alternatives, and in 
the choosing of one man makes his contribution to the world. 
Hence. human history is being decided from moment to moment, 
for in this scheme, man is the maker of history. 
Determinism, on the other hand, regards the existence of 
possibilities in the universe as destructive of the order of 
things. Determinism demands order in the universe. Each and 
every action of each and every part of the universe, from the 
largest planet to the smallest atom, is completely determined. 
A denial of this is equivalent to denying the intelligibility 
of things and, hence, the possibility of human knowledge. Man 
flatters himself by thinking that he makes some contribution 
to the development of the world; for he is little more than a 
pawn on the chess-board of history. And the personal feeling 
that things are being decided here and now is illusory. So 
47James, -The Dilemma of Determinism," p. 151. 
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radical is determinism's demand for order that it relieves man 
of power on his own act and on the world. In such a scheme mar 
is no maker of history, he is merely its witness. 
Indeterminism holds that there is a certain loose play 
~mong the parts of the universe. and that the laying down of 
some of these parts does not necessarily decree what the other 
parts shall be. Determinism professes that the parts of the 
universe already laid down absolutely decree what the other 
parts shall be. 48 
No matter which explanation of the nature of things seems 
more akin to one's own particular philosophical orientation, 
there nevertheless remains the curious and disturbing fact that 
although these two doctrines begin with exactly the same facts 
of experience they develop and terminate in diametrically 
opposed views. 
Perhaps an application of each of these two opposing views 
to a hypothetical situation will clarify the differences in-
volved. What, asks James. is meant by saying that his choice 
of which way to ~alk home after giving the present lecture is 
It the ~resent ~ament ambiguous and a matter of chance? nIt 
Ineans that both Divinity Avenue and Oxford Street are called; 
4<; but that only one, and that one, eithgr one, shall be chosen.»' 
48 Ibid ., p. 150. 
49Ibid ., p. 155. 
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That is to say, that prior to onets actual choosing, both al-
ternatives were possible. And at the moment of decision the 
issue was settled. One of the alternatives, and this the 
chosen one, was reduced from possibility to actuality, while 
the other alternative, and this the rejected one, was reduced 
from possibility to impossibility, at least as far as the pres 
ent moment is concerned. The important point is that until 
the moment of decision both alternatives were equally possible. 
This is the interpretation given by indeterminism. 
However, according to the interpretation given by deter-
minism one of the alternatives had been impossible from eter-
nity. To say that something is ambiguous or a matter of 
chance is equivalent to ascribing irrationality to it. Noth-
ing else could have been in its place, for it and it alone 
as demanded by the rest of nature. 
Determinism, however, seems to overstep itself at this 
point. Prior to the actual occurrence determinism had nothing 
to say about which alternative was possible and which one was 
impossible. It is only after ~ fact of the actual occur-
rence itself that determinism makes its pronouncement of im-
possibility, that this and only this occurrence is consistent 
ith the scheme of things, and that nothing else had even the 
remotest possibility of becoming actual. But this argument of 
eterminism is invalid as far as a conclusive proof is con-
cerned. Since both of these arguments have their starting 
49 
points in actual fact, no conclusive proof from actuality to 
impossibility can be attained. 
In the light of the invalidity of determinism's argument 
from actuality to impossibility and James's discussion of free-
dom under the name of chance, it seems likely that James would 
decide in favor of indeterminism. For he seems to have de-
clared the existence of chance events. "But although, in dis-
cussing the word ·chance.' I may at moments have seemed to be 
arguing for its real existence, I have not meant to do so yet. 
We have not yet ascertained whether this be a world of chance 
or no; at most, we have agreed that it seems so.50 And then, 
as if to remove all doubt about the exact nature of his task. 
James adds a qualifying remark: "And I now repeat what I said 
at the outset. that, from. any strict theoretical point of view, 
the question is insoluble.· 5l 
Thus indeterminism will continue defending the feeling 
that the individual decides history and adds novelty to the 
world. while the determinist carps back that such a feeling is 
illusory, because it was destined to be this way and no other. 
On the theoretic level determinism and indeterminism are en-
gaged in an interminable dialogue. 
The theoretic level is not the only level at which this 
50James,"The Dilemma of Determinism," p. 159, 
51 Ibid • 
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question may be approached. On the personal level one of thesE 
explanations may fit onets own notion of the nature of things. 
Now, whichever argument seems best fitted to explain the 
nature of things depends on what sort of universe one under-
stands oneself to inhabit. Should it be a monistic universe, 
then the argument of determinism is best fitted to explain the 
facts, On the other hand. should it be a pluralistic universe. 
then the argument of indeterminism is best fitted to explain 
the facts. This is so because a pluralistiC universe allows 
possibilities. while the monistic universe denies them. Funda-
mentally, such reasons as these are responsible for choosing 
either determinism or indeterminism to represent onets view oi 
the universe. n \'!hat divides us into possibility and anti-possi-
bility men 1s different faiths or postulates--postulates of 
rationality. To this man the world seems more rational with 
possibilities in it.--to that man more rational with possi-
bilities excluded; and talk as we will about having to yield 
to evidence, what makes us monists or pluralists, determinists 
or indeterminists. is at bottom always some sentiment like 
this."e>2 Note, however, that the selection of alternatives is 
not based on the cogency of the arguments themselves, but on 
evidence lying entirely outside either argument. The selec~ 
is made on the basis of what sort of universe one is thought 
e>2 Ibid., pp. 152-153. 
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to inhabit. Or. as James phrases it, on the sentiment of ra-
tionality. 
The basis, then. for choosing between determinism and in-
determinism, rests on a matter of personal taste. Certainly 
such a view operates within the framework of certain basic as-
sumptions about the intrinsic constitution of the universe, 
but in the final analysis it is still a matter of taste or 
sentiment. This being tLe case, the question of determinism 
versus indeterminism can be transposed to the level of the dif-
ference between monism and pluralism. Whichever one of these 
is accepted determines whether the universe receives a deter-
ministic or indeterministic interpretation. 
The dilemma between monism and pluralism is what James 
calls -the most pregnant of all the dilemmas in philosophy.H 5 3 
The selection of either alternative involves a host of implica-
tions which must be accepted. 
Monism. according to James. views the world as one unbend-
ing fact. "The universe is tight. monism claims. not loose; 
~nd you must take the irreducible whole of it as it is offered, 
br have no part or lot in it at all.,,54 To admit loose play 
~mong the parts is tantamount to intellectual suicide. Among 
53William James, Some Problems ~ Philosophy (New York, 
1911) J p. 114. 
54 Ibid •• p. 136. 
52 
the various objections James offers against the notion of a 
monistic universe, one is of special interest. This is his ob-
jection to the universe conceived as fatalistic. Although 
possibility and impossibility seem to be essential categories 
of human thinking, monism regards the former as pure illusion. 
And this must be som a monistic universe, for in this sort of 
universe everything is linked to every other thing and the 
principle of causality is regnant. Causality extends into the 
remote past and links each and every succeedLng moment there-
after. What is now is only the result of that which preceded 
it. Every effect is already contained in its cause. Such a 
process extends backward until the ultimate terminus A ~ is 
reached. But in this sort of universe, a monistlc universe in 
which causality reigns supreme, the end is already contalhed in 
the beginning. Novelty, therefore. is impossible. 
It is in this sort of universe that determinism finds its 
pwn proper environment. For determlnlsm professes "that those 
parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and 
~ecree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambi-
~uous possibilities hidden in its womb; the part we call the 
)resent is compatible with only one totality.«55 Since monism 
~nd determinism rule out possibilities, they therefore rule out 
reedom. 
55James, "The Dilemma of Determinism,- p. 150. 
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But such an explanation of the scheme of things is not 
satisfactory to one's own sense of freedom. "Our sense of 
'freedom' supposes that some things at least are decided here 
and now, that the passing moment may contain so~e novelty. be 
an original starting-point of events, and not merely transmit 
a push from elsewhere. n56 In James's view the present is not 
merely a transfer agency whose sole purpose is the passing a-
long of that which has been determined ages ago. On the con-
trary, the present makes a real contribution of its own and is, 
therefore, in terms of that which has preceded it, somethinQ 
really new. 
On the other hand, pluralism does not require that the 
universe be constructed along such rigid lines. It admits a 
certain loose play among the parts and considers them immersed 
in a wider sea of possibilities. "Some parts of the world,· 
pluralism admits, "cannot exist out of their wholes; but others 
~t says, can. To some extent the world seems genuinely addi-
~ive: it may really be so. (We cannot explain conceptually ~ 
~enuine novelties can come; but if one did come we could exper-
~ence that it came. We do, in fact, experience perceptual nov-
~lties all the while) • • • So the common-sense view of life, 
as something really dramatic, with work done, and things de-
cided here and now, is acceptable to pluralism. 'Free will' 
56James, SOIDe Problems ~ Philosophy, p. 139. 
means nothing but real novelty; so pluralism accepts the notior 
of free will. p57 To James, then, pluralism with its attending 
indeterminism is the only interpretation consonant with experi-
ence. 
The argument in "The Dilemma of DeterminismP is based on 
what James calls the judgment Ai rearet. It is a fact of ex-
perience that human beings are constantly called upon to make 
judgments of regret. That is to say, there are actual events 
in the range of one's experiences that would have left the 
world in a better condition had they never occurred. In other 
words, some events in human experience are regarded a~ regret-
table. These are such things as murder, treachery, and the 
like which are universally allowed to be regrettable. And even 
though such events as these may seem to be a fine mechanical 
fit with the rest of the universe, they are a poor moral fit. 
Though compatible with the chemic drift and flow of things, 
such events jar upon the moral aspects of life. Judgment ex-
presses itself in this respect by saying that something else 
ought to be in their place. 
Determinism, however, regards these events as necessary 
from eternity. Nothing else, after all, could have occurred 
in their place. For to admit that it is a chance event would 
be equivalent to obliterating intelligibility in the world. 
I 
57 Ibid., pp. 140-141. 
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If, as determinism conceives the matter, such events are re-
quired by every preceding event. then it is necessary that 
this event makes its advent at precisely this moment. In fact 
nothing else had the slightest chance of occurring, for this 
and only this was destined to be at this point. But on this 
interpretation the me~ning of regret becomes somewhat ambigu-
ous. For determinism, this is equivalent to saying that the 
universe would be batter without that which is necessary to it. 
The judgment of regret calls some events bad. "Calling a thi~ 
bad means. if it mean anything at all. that the thing ought 
not to be. that something else ought to be in its stead. De-
terminism. in denying that anything else can be in its stead, 
virtually defines the universe as a place in which what ought 
to be is impossible.- 58 But on deterministic grounds to regra 
the occurrence of only one or a few events is simply not eno~n 
Things being what they are these events could not be otherwise. 
What is to be regretted is the whole scheme of things which 
~akes this event only a small part of a larger whole. In re-
.lity, what is to be regretted is the very structure of the 
~niverse itself. 
For determinism to say that though it is impossible for 
some other event to have occurred yet it would have been bet-
~er had another event occu:::::::.:d is to espouse a kind of 
58James, -The Dilemma of Determinism," pp. 161-162. 
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pessimism. But pessimism is inconsistent in a world of events 
which cannot be otherwise. In order for determinism to escape 
pessimism it must abandon the judgment of regret. This may be 
accomplished by regarding the so-called regretful occurrences 
in the universe, more commonly known as evils, as being the 
condition by which a greater good is produced. That is to say, 
the presence of evil in the universe really makes the universe 
a better place, since it allows the production of a greater 
good that could never have been achieved had evil been lacking. 
Having undergone an ethical metamorphosis deterministic pessi-
mism becomes a deterministic optimism by abolishing the judg-
ment of regret. But this begets a rather strange logical pre-
dicament. Determinism calls the jud~ment of regret wrong be-
cause it is pessimistic in implying that what is impossible 
nevertheless ought to be. But if the judgment of regret is 
wrong, then it ought to be replaced by another kind of judgmen1 
and this, presumably, would be a judgment of approval. But 
since this judgment is necessary nothing else can be in its 
place. Thus, the discussion immediately lapses into the same 
difficulty as before, namely, a universe in which what ought tc 
• 
be seems impossible. No sooner has one phase of the problem 
been settled than another phase presents itself. 
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We have rescued our actions from the bonds~ evil, but 
our judgments are now held fast. When murders and treach-
eries cease to be sins, regrets are theoretic absurdities 
and errors. The theoretic and active life thus play a 
kind of see-saw with each other on the ground of evil. 
The rise of either sends the other down. Murder and traKh-
ery cannot be good without regret being bad: regret can 
not be good without treachery and murder being bad. Both, 
however, are supposed to have been foredoomed; so some-
thing mU$t5~e fatally unreasonable, absurd. and wrong in 
the world. 
Hence, determinism finds itself in a rather awkward position on 
the question of evil. Now, determinism cannot bury its head in 
the sand ostrich-like and ignore the problem. For judgments of 
regret, or evils, are existing facts in the world and determin-
ism is obliged to consider them in its account of all that is 
fated to be. 
Yet without searching too far there may be a way to ob-
viate this difficulty. The necessary events wrongly regretted 
may be really good and yet the error in regretting them may be 
also good. To accomplish such a solution requires but one sim-
ple condition: -The world must not be regarded as a machine 
whose final purpose is the making real of any outward good, but 
~ather a contrivance for deepening the theoretic consciousness of 
~hat goodness and evil in their intrinsic natures are. Not the 
~oing either of good or of evil is what nature cares for, but 
the knowing of them: 60 And this attitude toward the world is 
59 Ibid •• pp. 163-164. 
60Ibid ., p. 165. 
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what James refers ~o as the gnos~ica~ attitude. According to 
this attitude the world is neither an optimism nor a pessimis~, 
but ra~her, a gnosticism. But since this word has an already 
established association, James calls it subj~cti,Vism. and the 
syb1ectiyisti& attitude. 
The essential a£pect of subjectivism, according to James. 
is the fact that it considers what happens in ~he world as su~ 
sidiary to what one thinks or feels about it. Evil justifies 
:3vil by awakening man's sense of evil, arid eventually remorse 
and regret about its existence. And the error in remcrse and 
regret, the error of thinking that it could have been other-
wise, justifies itself by its use. Now, a purely mechanical 
determinism, which .James calls hard determinism, smiles in the 
face of &ny moral claims made on events in the world. It is 
convinced that the world abides by the law of physical continu-
ity and ~oral attitudes toward it are nothing but loose think-
ing. Considering few of his listeners to be of this view, 
James approaches the problem of what he calls soft geterminism. 
This latter kind of determinism ~llows questions of good and 
evil to mingle with questions of cause and effect. But in 
allowing these questions to mingle determinism involves i~self 
in a dilemma. "The dilemma of this determinism is one whose 
left horn is pessimism an~ v~ose right horn is subjectivism. 
In other words, if determinism is to escape pessimism, it must 
leave off looking at the goods and ills of life in a simple 
59 
objective way, and regard them as materials, indifferent in 
themselves, for the production of consciousness, scientific 
and ethical. in us.u 6l Now, to be satisfied with pessimism in 
considering the whole as bad is to make the least amount of de 
mands on the universe. Of this attitude James has nothing to 
say. For his own part, however, he prefers to pursue the ques 
tion further, since his own view demands more of the universe. 
The other horn of the dilemma involves subjectivism. Sub-
jectivism regards the goods and evils in the world as practi-
cally indistinguishable except insofar as they elicit moral 
judgments. Its sole aim is the attainment of knowledge of gooc 
and evil. Men should engage in the goods and evils of the 
world chiefly for the purpose of enriching their own conscious-
ness of good and evil. The things of the world are merely in-
struments in the process. The mood or attitude achieved as a 
result of the encounter with the things of the world is of pri-
mary importance. It is the tasting of the fruit of the tree 
of knowledge of good and evil. and the tasting alone. that is 
important. Now. in order to attain the maximum degree of the 
knowledge of good and evil it becomes necessary to expose one-
self to the widest possible range of experiences. But if the 
sole aim of this attitude is to d~eR~n man's subjective knowl-
edge of the world. why should there be any limit to such a 
61 Ik1d., p. 166. 
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process? In such a conception there seems to be no room for 
a hierarchy of values. According to James, the past history 
of the world provides evidence of what to expect from this 
attitude. 
Everywhere it fosters the fatalistic mood of mind. 
It makes those who are already too inert mor2 passive 
still; it renders wholly reck ess those whose energy is 
alreadr in excess. All through history we find how sub-jectiv sm, as soon as it has a free career, exhausts it-
self in every sort of spiritual, moral and practical li-
cense. Its optimism turns to an ethical indifference, 
which infallibly brin2s dissolution in its train ••• 
After the pure and classic truths, the excitinq and ran-
cid ones must be experienced; and if the stupid virtues 
of the philistine herd do not then come in and save so-
ciety from the influence of the children of light, &2sort 
of inward putrefaction becomes its inevitable doom. 
If feeling becomes both the source and limit of knowledge,noth 
ing '3'1 se can be ~xpectec:.:. At its wors t. subj ecti vi sm degen-
erates into a crud~ sensualism. The subjectivistic attitude 
by its nature provides no defense against this sort of dissolu 
tion. If life has no other meaning than the exploitation and 
edification of the momentary and changing sensibilities en-
countered in life, then the world seems to be a rather gloomy, 
meaningless place after all. 
Such an explanation is not acceptable +r) James's way of 
thinking. To be sure, his objections are not theoretic; they 
are of the practical order. James chooses words of Carlyle to 
express his feelings in this matter: "Hang your sensibilities~ 
62 Ibid., pp. 171-172 
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Stop your snivelling complaints. and your equally snivelling 
~aptures! Leave off your general emotional tomfoolery, and get 
to WORK like men. n63 But this constitutes a break with the 
subjectivistic attitude toward the world. It means that man is 
• creature with a task to be accomplished and not simply a crea~ 
ture immersed in the feeling of the moment. Successive moments 
become the measure of man's success in dealing with the facts 
pf life. And conduct, not feeling, becomes the principal con-
cern of life. With the realization that a task lies before 
him, man has made the transition from the subjective to the ob-
jective philosophy of things. It matters little whether the 
task be accepted gladly and willingly or grudgingly and unwill-
ingly; only accomplished it must be. Having accepted the task 
~nd accomplished his end, howevex\small that may be, man is at 
peace with the rest of the world. This is so because in this 
~iew each individual part may help or hinder the other parts, 
put the individual's obligation ends with the performance of 
~is own duty. The individual players in the world drama are 
responsible only for their own roles. They have been called to 
~ontribute to only part of the drama. But to w.t end the drama 
nay lead rests with the author of the drama itself. 
The only consistent way of representing such a pluralistic 
~orld, a world in which the semi-independent parts affect each 
63 Ibid., p. 174. 
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other for good or evil, is the indeterministic way. For what 
gain is there in feeling that the right way has been achieved 
unless the wrong way was felt to be equally possible? What 
rneaning would remorse and regret, blame and condemna tion ha ve 
unless the right way were an open possibility? Without am-
biguity or chanee about future events there is no meaning. ill 
cannot understand regret without the ad~ission of real, gen-
uine possibilities in the world. Only tben is it other than 
a mockery to feel, after we have failed to do our best. that 
an irreparable opportunity is gone from the unlv_rse, the loss 
of which it must forever mourn. tl64 
And so, after a,long and involved consideration of the 
question of determinism versus indeterminism. James confesses 
that he is obliged to state his conclusions in an altogether 
personal way. But it cannot be otherwise, as he conceives it, 
for this method is demanded by the very nature of the problem. 
Even so, the world still remains a mystery no matter what view 
one takes about it. The indeterminism James defends, "the freE-
will theory of popular sense based on the judgment of regret, 
represents that world as vulnerable. and liable to be injured 
by certain of its parts, if they act wrongly. And it repre-
sents their acting wrong as a matter of possibility or accident 
64 Ibid •• p. 176. 
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neither inevitable nor yet to be infallibly warded off. • • • 
It gives us a pluralistic, restless universe, in which no sin-
~le point of view can ever take in the whole 11 65 scene •••• 
This same line of argumentation appears in Pragmatism 
~here it takes the form of an argument from a melioristic uni-
~erse. Determinism regards the notion of possibility as a 
product of human ignorance. It is convinced that "necessity 
~nd impossibility between them rule the destinies of the 
~orld.,,66 Free will in this sort of universe means that things 
can be other, and most important, better than they have been. 
Were it the case that the past and the present are completely 
good, man would be only too happy to have the future imitate 
them. In this kind of world free w.ill would be man's great-
est blight. "Freedom in a world already perfect could only 
mean freedom to ~ worse, and who could be so insane to wish 
that.,,67 Hence, the only possibility one can claim for the 
world is that it may be better. In this sense free will is 
considered a doctrine of relief. It provides a basis for hope 
about the future through human intervention. "Free will prag-
matically means novelties in ~ WO'~t the right to expect 
65 Ibid " pp. 176-177. 
66William James, P.agmatism (New York, 1907), p. 84. 
67 I b i 9.. p. 85 • 
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that in its deepest elements as well as in its surface phenom-
ena. the future may not ~dentically repeat and imitate the 
past. ,,68 And the only way that novelties is if there can occur 
are real possibilities in the present moment. The question, 
then, as James indicated at the outset, lirelates solely to the 
existence of possibilities." 
The difference between monism and pluralism is the dif-
ference between unity and multiplicity. Monism and pluralism 
differ radically on the question whether the world is on its 
way from unity or .:t.Q. unity. If the·monistic universe could be 
characterized as a universe in which "in the beginning was the 
Word," then the pluralistic universe could be characterized as 
the universe in which Min the beginning were the words. 11 And 
this characterization of the pluralistic universe seems con-
sonant with James's preference in speaking of the Ultimate 
rather than the Absolute. 69 
In James's pluralistic universe multiplicity forms an in-
tegral part. The working out of one's destiny is a piecemeal 
task in this universe, but it can be done because there is 
possibility. And man through his choice of possibilities de-
termines his own futurE. 
68 I bid., p. 84. 
69 Ibi9 ., p. 106. 
CHAPTER V 
CRITIQUE OF JAMES'S NOTION OF FREEDOM 
On the basis of all that has been said there can be no 
doubt that James holds for the notion of human freedom. At the 
outset of his philosophical analysis James envisages the ques-
~ion at the level of the dispute between determinism and in-
determinism. At this level James observed that the question 
related solely to the existence of possibilities. And the 
~ind of possibilities James has in mind are those which make 
~o demands on the rest of nature, neither anteiedent nor con-
sequent. For admit either and one sinks back into the block 
lniverse of monism in which causality allows no single fact to 
ascape its all pervading reach. In such a universe freedom 
lnder the name of chance is impossible. To his original ap~ 
praisal of the question James remains true. Although the dis-
~ute between determinism and indeterminism was found to be in-
~oluble on the purely theoretic level, indeterminism was chos-
~n because of its compatibility with the kind of universe one 
s thought to inhabit. In James's case this was seen to be a 
,luralistic universe, because it allows one to feel that his 
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deeda influence the character of the universe. ~~reover. in 
auch a view one'a deeds may influence the universe for the bet-
ter. 
James's moral argument in favor of freedom is based on 
the experiences of life. The subjective experiences of en-
tertaining and choosing alternatives, feeling that changes 
neve been wrought in the world, and feeling that the world can 
become a better place through human action are part and par-
cel of the human experience. No matter how common certain 
human actions may outwardly appear, they are inwardly unique. 
In one t , own peraonal experience decision is an undeniable 
fact. "To YQurselye,. it is true, those very acts of choice, 
which to me are so blind. opaque, .. and external, are the op-
pOSites of this; for you are within them and effect them. To 
you they appear as deci.ions; and deCiSions, for him who makes 
them, are altogether peculiar psychic facta. u70 This felt 
power on one t • own acta any on the world allows one to feel 
that he haa a part in determining what sort of world this will 
be. And this sort of world becomes possible when one views 
the world of human actions as a world governed by choice, not 
destiny. 
Presumably, everything already said on the psychological 
70 James, ,t The Dilemma of Determinism," p. 1~8. 
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aspects of volition are applicable here. The sustaining of onl 
idea lather than others by means of the effort of attention 
allows one to choose one possibility rather than another,there· 
by making it actual. This actuality assumes its place in the 
world as man's contribution to the world. 
No sooner, however, is the Jamesian notion a freedom char 
acterized as that which effects. or allows man to effect. 
changes in the world than a difficulty arises. This diffi-
culty is concerned with James's notion of agency in action. 
Criticism of James·s thought at this point is conspicuous by 
comparison to the absence of criticism elsewhere in our treat-
ment of James·s notion d freedom. Yet this difficulty, since 
it underlies both the psychological and philosophical aspects 
of the question and touches the very ground of freedom. cannot 
be ignored. When pressed on the meaning of agency, James's 
answer seems to shake the very ground of freedom itself. 
By its very nature the consideration of agency in human 
action involves the metaphysical notion of substance. The 
present inquiry will not attempt to treat the notion of sub-
stance as it occurs in James's thought. Rather, it will ap-
proach the problem under the aspect of agency alone, that is. 
the way in which one thing influences another thing. Or more 
accurately perhaps, it will consider the notion of efficient 
causality. In this connection the inquiry will concentrate on 
making one small point regarding the notion of agency in 
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James's thought: this is the fact that James is indifferent 
to the notion of agency. 
Earlier. 71 we noted that James's notion of freedom con-
cerned itself solely with the existence of possibilities in 
the universe. Now, if free will is solely a question of pos-
sibility, then the means by which possibility is reduced to 
actuality is of paramount importance. In the preceding analy-
sis decision was seen to reduce possibility to actuality. But 
then a question immediately arises: How is it that inward de-
cision has outward effects? The an.-er to this question must 
constitute the very ground of freedom itself. 
One expr~ssion of James's indifference to the notion of 
agency is to be found in an illuminating passage from his cor-
respondences inwhich he expresses his feelings in this mat-
ter in unequivocal terms. 
• • .1 care absolutely nothing 
whether there be 'agents' or no agents. or whether mants ac-
tions be really 'his' or not. What I care for is that my 
moral reactions .'hould find a real outward application.,,72 This 
is not just an isolated remark culled from among scattered and 
private expressions of James's thought. On the contrary, it 
is consonant with the general spirit of pragmatism which ex~ 
71 See above, p. 46. 
72William James, ~ Lette.s ~ Will~am James (Boston, 
1926) iI, 141. 
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one to look away from first things, from principles and ab-
stract notions p and look to final things, the fruits of human 
thought and action. Even if one were to grant the pragmatic 
approach in this instance, it would still be a strange moral 
universe in which agency and responsibility were lacking. 
James's indifference to the notiond agency is nowhere 
more evident than it is in the foregoing passage. But such 
a view seems to cut the ground from under any form of moral 
action. In expressing this indifference to the agent in ac-
tivity and yet speaking of moral acts having application in 
the world. James is proceeding AA ~ there are agents. Free-
dom, like morality, requires more than bare possibilities. 
James's assertion that men are within their deeds and effect 
them becomes ambiguous when considered in the light of his 
attitude toward agency 1n action. 
To establish the existence of human freedom, James felt 
that it was imperative to break the cosmic block. the strictly 
concatenated causal universe of deterministic monism. To this 
end the all-pervasive principle of causality must be destroyed. 
Without causality in every event James felt that there is some 
ambiguity about future events. In this connection freedom undelt' 
the name of chance becomes meaningful. Free acts, or chance 
events, come into existence with no antecedent claims demanding 
that they make their appearance at a certain point. Chance 
viewed in this way is an independent variable not deducible ~ 
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from the antecedent conditions. Until the moment of decision 
the selection of one possibility rather than another is total-
ly ambiguous. Now it is important to note in this connection 
the fact that the kind of possibilities James has in mind are 
not mere logical possibilities, but genuine possibilities whicl 
really tempt a man. 73 Pragmatically, this means possibilities 
which have consequences for future action. Moreover, the mean 
ing for future action is justified because one feels that the 
goal is attainable by means of human action. 
On the basis of James's conception of the structure of 
the monistic universe it is understandable why he demands that 
causality be sacrificed in order to insure freedom. For in a 
monistic universe things cannot be otherwise. Human action is 
impotent against such mechanical forces. However. to rid the 
universe of this notion of causality is one thing; to rid the 
universe of the causality by means of which human decision ha s 
outward effects is quite another thing. Yet this is the effect 
of James's indifference to the question of agency in action, 
for it neutralizes human action. 
If lnwa'rd deciSion is to have outward effects, there must 
be some way in which the individual can claim or influence one 
of the possibilities which exist for him. To say that one 
thing influences another is to say that there is a causal 
73 James, principles, II, 576. 
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relation between them. This, however. is not the kind of caus 
ality which James seeks to destroy, for this kind of influence 
mayor may not come to pass, and even the way in which it may 
come to pass is variable. It is ambiguous before the fact and 
cannot be deduced A priori, for until the facts of brute ex-
perience have been remoulded in terms of the present needs, 
there is no way of telling what the action will be, since 
there i$ no way of telling before the fact what the exact need 
will be. The source of this kind of free act is the indivi-
dual who determines that the world of experience is to be re-
moulded in one way rather than another. 
If James's objection to the notion of agent or agency is 
merely a matter of names. then a solution seems quite simple. 
change the name but preserve the fact. On the other hand. if 
. James·s objection to the notion of agent is based on his re-
fusal to make a metaphysical commitment. then he has neutral-
ized the actions of the very beings whose freedom he was at-
tempting to insure. Causality in the form of human agency is 
the means by~ich the world may be changed. and what is yet 
not present may make its appearance. It is the real source of 
novelty in the world. Genuine possibilities really tempt a 
man because there is present within him the existential com-
plement whereby all things in the mal world come to be, and 
by which men exercise power over their own acts and over the 
world. 
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To assert as James does that all that is required for 
human freedom is the existence of possibilities is simply not 
enough. For it leaves unanswered the question as to the means 
by which possibilities are reduced to actualities. And in 
the real world it is actualities and not possibilities thatm 
a difference. Just as it required more than possibility to 
make the real world, it requires more than possibility to make 
man free. It is meaningless to grant freedom to men without at 
the same time granting them the means of exe~cising it. 
It is pragmatic maxim that there 1A no difference that 
does not ma" a difference. No more useful application of 
this maxim can be found than the question of human freedom. 
The difference is simply stated: without the means pf achiev-
ing effects in the world man has no ground for expecting that 
the future can be better than the past. A possible knife will 
cut possible bread, but possible bread will not nourish a 
starving human being. Possibilities only say what can be, 
deeds make things be. And as far as the real world is con-
cerned. the mul tiplicati on of possibi lities .!.Si infinitum will 
never beget one real difference. 
In disregarding the notion of agency in human action Jame 
has forfeited the only means by which the future can be made 
to differ from the past. Considering the question in its tem-
poral aspect one might say that the only way the future can 
differ from the past is on the condition that it is in the 
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hands of the present there to be moulded according to the need. 
and intentions of men. Only in this way can one speak of free. 
dom in terms of novelty. And Ja~ests notion of freedom under 
the name of chance, a free gift, coming as it does with no 
claim made upon it, is a useless gift because it is existen-
ti.lly neutral, i.e., merely p~sslble. To say that the future 
may differ from the past means, indeed, if it mean anything at 
all, that there exists in the present moment that which pos-
sesses the means of influencing the future course of events. 
In disregarding agency Jame. has not provided the grounds for 
the difference between the future and the past. He has for-
feited the means of b~idging the Qap between possibility and 
actuality. 
Thus, James has relinquished the right of expecting that 
the future should exhibit the slightest modicum of difference 
from the past. To deny agency is to sever the link between 
the possible and the actual. When the existence of possibil~ 
ities becomes the ade criterion for the existence of freedom, 
one has lost all con.tact with reality. Possibility is only 
the halfway house on the road to freedom, over and above this 
it requires that which is ontologically endowed with the means 
of exercising its freedom. 
All of these difficulties have arisen because James has 
chosen to ignore the ontological ground of freedom. Yet the 
meaning of James's notion of freedom is clear in spite of 
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these difficulties. No solution of the problem of agency will 
be attempted. Indeed, no solution seems possible since Jame. 
haa expressed indifference to agency in action. But James did 
not, after all. propose to offer a proof for the existence of 
human freedom. H~ merely described the feeling experienced in 
one's subjective encounter with the world. 
At this point. however, we are confronted with the cur-
ious fact that what James' a notion of freedom demands on the 
practIcal level cannot receive justification on the theoretic 
level. The flct of agency in action is preCisely the point 
from which James's notion of freedom derives its meaning. i.e. 
a subject in a world, acting in the world, and influencing the 
world for good or evil. Remove the fact of agency from the co 
crete li fa ai tuation and James' a whole notion 0 f freedom become 
meaningless. Yet James will not accept in principle what his 
notlo~ of freedom requires in practice. Not only is freedom 
established as it is found in the lived experience, but its 
hole meaning is confined to that exp.~lence. One must not 
prescind from the actual experience itself and consider ab-
stractly the meaning and, indeed, even the possibility of such 
n experience. To do 10 would be to 108e contact with free-
om in the concretE situation. and we have seen the futility 
f the debate between determinism and indeterminis.. Hence 
the whole meaning of freedom is to be found in one's subjective 
xperiance on the practical level. 
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Although James felt that the science of psychology could 
make no claim on the question, since effort was unmeasurable, 
he nevertheless stressed the subjective experience of choosing 
attended with the feeling that more or less effort could be 
exerted. Psychologically, then, the feeling that one deter-
mines the action of the moment is present. 
Philosophically, the same experience of choosing provides 
the most basic sort of evidence for freedom. Such an inward 
experience involves the feeling that decision has a real out-
ward application. Not only is decision capable of effecting 
changes in the world, but it is also capable of changing the 
world for the better. Pragmatically, this means that the no-
tion of freedom has consequences as a guide for future action. 
And the kind of universe in which it has meaning as a guide 
for future action is the pluralistic universe. For in this 
sort of universe possibility forms a part, and it is other thar 
a mockery to feel that onets deeds illuminate historical ti~~. 
Therefore, psychologically as well as philosophically, 
freedom is a meaningful notion on the practical level. The 
best available evidence in behalf of human freedom lies in the 
subjective experience of freedom itself. In a pluralistic 
universe freedom is true, since it is capable of getting into 
8 satisfactory relation with the rest of onets experiences. 
the experience of choosing, willing, and feeling that one has 
left the world in a little better condition than the condition 
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in which one found it. In this sense, freedom is a moral pos-
tulate about the kind of world in which one lives. Human de-
cision, then, is the means by which one determines what pos-
sibilities are to become actual. 
There can be no doubt, then, that J~mes was convinced of 
the fact of human freedom. James refused to yield to the 
claims of deterministic monism over human action. Although thE 
difficulty of agency in action has shaken the very ground of 
freedom, the meaning James wishes to ascribe to freedom is not 
lost. He has envisaged the whole question on the level of the 
concrete situation where the individual, or self, is called 
upon to modify the world of brute experience. On this level, 
man's volitional nature is responsible for modifying the world. 
In modifying the world, man is not a mere transfer agency of 
forces initiated in the remote past; rather, he is a real con-
tributing agency remoulding brute experience according to the 
needs of the present. At the same time, man builds his own 
inner self, for man is the author of his own deeds, and these 
deeds belong to him as his contribution to the world. ~~n as 
a self, is a self in relation to the world he has built. Be-
tween the world as man finds it, and the world as man leaves 
tt, lies decision. In other words, the modification of the 
outward world of brute experience is dependent on inward de-
cision. Decision, then, is the subjective creative act by 
which man constitutes not only the historical development of 
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the world, but alsoconsti tutes himself in relati on to the 
~orld. 
Hence, on the basis of all that has been said, we submit 
that self-determination, i.e., the ability of the self to de-
termine its own unique relation to the world, is the essential 
~eaning of freedom in the philosophy of William James. 
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